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On-Demand Drivers And The Right To Collective Bargaining: Why Seattle's Ordinance Does Not Violate Federal Antitrust Laws, Jacob Aleknavicius 2020 Chicago-Kent College of Law

On-Demand Drivers And The Right To Collective Bargaining: Why Seattle's Ordinance Does Not Violate Federal Antitrust Laws, Jacob Aleknavicius

Chicago-Kent Law Review

No abstract provided.


Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review 2020 Seattle University School of Law 81818app手机版下载

Table Of Contents, Seattle University Law Review

Seattle University Law Review

Table of Contents


Behavioral Lessons For Antitrust Enforcement, Avishalom Tor 2020 Notre Dame Law School

Behavioral Lessons For Antitrust Enforcement, Avishalom Tor

Faculty Lectures and Presentations

These are lecture slides to accompany a .

Avishalom Tor, professor and director of the Research Program on Law and Market Behavior at Notre Dame Law School, delivered this lecture to lawyers and economists of the Department of Justice’s antitrust division in Washington D.C. and throughout the country in the summer of 2020.

81818app手机版下载The lecture provides a systematic review of the lessons empirical behavioral findings offer to antitrust law, enforcement, and policy. Professor Tor introduces key findings of behavioral antitrust and explores their implications for doctrine and enforcement across the field, in areas ranging from horizontal restraints ...


Antitrust And Platform Monopoly, Herbert J. Hovenkamp 2020 University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 81818app手机版下载

Antitrust And Platform Monopoly, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

This article first considers an often-discussed question about large internet platforms that deal directly with consumers: Are they “winner take all,” or natural monopoly, firms? That question is complex and does not produce the same answer for every platform. The closer one looks at digital platforms they less they seem to be winner-take-all. As a result, we can assume that competition can be made to work in most of them.

81818app手机版下载Second, assuming that an antitrust violation is found, what should be the appropriate remedy? Breaking up large firms subject to extensive scale economies or positive network effects is generally thought ...


Do We Need Kyc/Aml: The Bank Secrecy Act And Virtual Currency Exchanges, Stan Sater 2020 Founders Legal Bekiares Eliezer 81818app手机版下载

Do We Need Kyc/Aml: The Bank Secrecy Act And Virtual Currency Exchanges, Stan Sater

Arkansas Law Review

81818app手机版下载"Technology is moving faster than government or law can keep up. It's moving faster than you can keep up: you should be asking the question of what are your rights and who owns your data. - Gus Hunt, 2013 CIA Chief Technology Officer1 The Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, commonly referred to as the Bank Secrecy Act (the BSA), is the U.S. government’s 800-pound gorilla when it comes to regulating virtual currency.2 It has been expanded, transformed, and updated since its initial passage in 1970 to keep pace with new developments in global terrorism and money ...


Antitrust: What Counts As Consumer Welfare?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp 2020 University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Antitrust: What Counts As Consumer Welfare?, Herbert J. Hovenkamp

Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law

81818app手机版下载Antitrust’s consumer welfare principle is accepted in some form by the entire Supreme Court and the majority of other writers. However, it means different things to different people. For example, some members of the Supreme Court can simultaneously acknowledge the antitrust consumer welfare principle even as they approve practices that result in immediate, obvious, and substantial consumer harm. At the same time, however, a properly defined consumer welfare principle is essential if antitrust is to achieve its statutory purpose, which is to pursue practices that injure competition. The wish to make antitrust a more general social justice statute is ...


After Forty Years Of Antitrust Revision And Apple Inc. V. Pepper, What Now Illinois Brick?, Jeffrey L. Harrison 2020 William & Mary Law School

After Forty Years Of Antitrust Revision And Apple Inc. V. Pepper, What Now Illinois Brick?, Jeffrey L. Harrison

William & Mary Business Law Review

Nineteen seventy-seven was a paradigm-shifting year in antitrust law. Decisions by the Supreme Court greatly limited the type of parties who could successfully bring antitrust actions and what types of activities would violate the antitrust laws. First, in January of that year, the Court, in Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat81818app手机版下载, ruled that to mount a case the plaintiff had to have suffered an antitrust injury. In other words, even if the antitrust laws were violated, the party raising the issue had to have suffered the type of harm the laws were designed to avoid. Then in a fourteen day span the ...


Investment Promotion And Facilitation For Sustainable Development, Brooke Guven 2020 Columbia Law School, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 81818app手机版下载

Investment Promotion And Facilitation For Sustainable Development, Brooke Guven

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment Staff Publications

Investment is a critical component of sustainable development. In particular, under the right conditions, foreign direct investment (FDI) can improve economic growth and living standards, create jobs, transfer technology and know-how and result in supply chain upgrading. However, its benefits are not automatic, and, if not carefully governed, investment can result in harm to the environment, labour standards and lead to tax evasion or other undesirable outcomes. Investment promotion and investment facilitation, in turn, can help states attract, expand and retain FDI.


Unsportsmanlike Conduct: An Analysis Of The Nfl's Expansion Policy Under U.S. Antitrust Law, Lucas Follett 2020 Boston College Law School 81818app手机版下载

Unsportsmanlike Conduct: An Analysis Of The Nfl's Expansion Policy Under U.S. Antitrust Law, Lucas Follett

Boston College Law Review

81818app手机版下载The National Football League (NFL) has a policy for admitting expansion franchises that conditions admission on the affirmative vote of three-fourths of current member teams. Limitations on the number of franchises allow a small group to control the provision of professional football, and every element thereof—from prices of tickets and concessions to the quality of the overall experience. The United States’ antitrust law restricts conduct, by agreement or monopolization, that has the effect of restricting trade to the detriment of consumers. This Note discusses the antitrust setting in which the NFL’s expansion policy exists and the foundational legislation ...


The Heavy Hand Of Amazon: A Seller Not A Neutral Platform, Edward J. Janger, Aaron D. Twerski 2020 Brooklyn Law School 81818app手机版下载

The Heavy Hand Of Amazon: A Seller Not A Neutral Platform, Edward J. Janger, Aaron D. Twerski

Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law

Since the adoption of Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts, every party in a product’s distribution chain has been potentially liable for injuries caused by product defects. Consumers who buy from reputable sellers are almost always guaranteed to have a solvent defendant if injured by a product defect. Amazon, though responsible for a vast number of retail sales, has sought to avoid liability by claiming that it is not a seller but a neutral platform that merely facilitates third-party sales to consumers. With two significant exceptions, most courts have sided with Amazon and concluded that Amazon is ...


Made In The Usa: Technological Corporatism, Infrastructure Regulation, And Dupont 1902-1917, Roman Y. Shemakov 2020 Swarthmore College

Made In The Usa: Technological Corporatism, Infrastructure Regulation, And Dupont 1902-1917, Roman Y. Shemakov

Swarthmore Undergraduate History Journal

81818app手机版下载The turn of the twentieth century radically renewed industrial organization across the United States. Early American corporations -- centralized manufacturing hubs with journeymen and apprentices laboring under one roof -- were seldom prepared for the transformations that scientific management and structural reorganization would bring to social relations. At the helm of World War 1, DuPont became the epitome of broader national restructuring. Through a close relationship with American military industries and legislatures, the DuPont brothers came to represent Business as an inseparable component of the State. While labor historiography has primarily focused on organizers’ relationship with regulators, important segments of its inverse ...


The 2010 Hmgs Ten Years Later: Where Do We Go From Here?, Steven C. Salop, Fiona Scott Morton 2020 Georgetown University Law Center 81818app手机版下载

The 2010 Hmgs Ten Years Later: Where Do We Go From Here?, Steven C. Salop, Fiona Scott Morton

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

81818app手机版下载In this short article, which is part of a RIO Symposium on the Tenth Anniversary of the 2010 Merger Guidelines, we suggest a number of improvements that should be considered in the next revision of the Guidelines. Our analysis is based on the observation that horizontal merger policy has suffered from under-enforcement. We provide evidence that the enforcement agencies face significant resource constraints which require a triage process that inevitably leads to under-enforcement. In light of merger law placing greater weight on avoiding false negatives and under-deterrence than false positive and over-deterrence, the article suggests a number of ways in ...


Asymmetric Stakes In Antitrust Litigation, Erik Hovenkamp, Steven C. Salop 2020 USC Gould School of Law 81818app手机版下载

Asymmetric Stakes In Antitrust Litigation, Erik Hovenkamp, Steven C. Salop

University of Southern California Legal Studies Working Paper Series

81818app手机版下载Private antitrust litigation often involves a dominant firm being accused of exclusionary conduct by a smaller rival or entrant. Importantly, the firms in such cases generally have asymmetric stakes: the defendant typically has a much larger financial interest on the line. We explore the broad policy implications of this fact using a novel model of litigation with endogenous effort. Asymmetric stakes lead dominant defendants to invest systematically more resources into litigation, causing the plaintiff’s success probability to fall below the efficient level—a distortion that carries over to ex ante settlements. We explain that enhanced damages may reduce the ...


Consumer Welfare & The Rule Of Law: The Case Against The New Populist Antitrust Movement, Elyse Dorsey, Geoffrey A. Manne, Jan M. Rybnicek, Kristian Stout, Joshua D. Wright 2020 Pepperdine University

Consumer Welfare & The Rule Of Law: The Case Against The New Populist Antitrust Movement, Elyse Dorsey, Geoffrey A. Manne, Jan M. Rybnicek, Kristian Stout, Joshua D. Wright

Pepperdine Law Review

81818app手机版下载Populist antitrust notions suddenly are fashionable again. At their core is the view that antitrust law is responsible for a myriad of purported socio-political problems plaguing society today, including but not limited to rising income inequality, declining wages, and increasing economic and political concentration. Seizing on Americans’ fears about changes to the modern US economy, proponents of populist antitrust policies assert the need to fundamentally reshape how we apply our nation’s competition laws in order to implement a variety of prescriptions necessary to remedy these perceived social ills. The proposals are varied and expansive but have the unifying theme ...


Ride-Hailing Drivers As Autonomous Independent Contractors: Let Them Bargain!, Ronald C. Brown 2020 University of Hawaii Law School

Ride-Hailing Drivers As Autonomous Independent Contractors: Let Them Bargain!, Ronald C. Brown

Washington International Law Journal

“Autonomous” workers include most gig-platform drivers, like those working globally for Uber and Lyft, who are usually classified as independent contractors and are ineligible for labor protections and benefits. The “new economy” and its business model, with its fissurization and increased use of contingent and outsourced workers hired as independent contractors, provide employers flexibility and lower costs by shifting labor costs to the workers. Many of these workers operate more as employees rather than genuine independent contractors or self-employed entrepreneurs, causing lost employee labor benefits and costing the government billions of lost tax dollars. Legal attempts continue to classify these ...


The Antitrust Case For Consumer Primacy In Corporate Governance, Ramsi A. Woodcock 2020 University of California, Irvine School of Law

The Antitrust Case For Consumer Primacy In Corporate Governance, Ramsi A. Woodcock

UC Irvine Law Review

81818app手机版下载Consumers have been left out of the great debate over the mission of the firm, in which advocates of shareholder value maximization face off against advocates of corporate social responsibility, who would allow management leeway to allocate profits to workers and other non-shareholder insiders of the firm. The consumer welfare standard adopted by antitrust law in the 1970s requires that firms allocate their profits neither to shareholders nor to workers or other firm insiders. Instead, the standard requires that firms strive to have no profits at all, by charging the lowest possible prices for their products. Such a profit-minimization requirement ...


The Economics And Antitrust Of Bundling, Rajeev R. Bhattacharya 2020 Pepperdine University

The Economics And Antitrust Of Bundling, Rajeev R. Bhattacharya

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

This article explains the economics and antitrust of bundling. I first show that popular arguments such as demand complementarities, economies of scope, and price discrimination are not sufficient. I then detail potentially anticompetitive factors such as leverage and opacity. I then use simple examples to show how variation in consumer valuations explains bundling and is not anticompetitive. Finally, I explore other business judgment rule explanations for bundling.


Antitrust Law In The New Economy By Mark R Patterson, Thomas Dicsi 2020 Osgoode Hall Law School of York University

Antitrust Law In The New Economy By Mark R Patterson, Thomas Dicsi

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

81818app手机版下载THE DRAFTERS OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST ACT of 1890 would understandably be perplexed by the complexity of modern economic systems. These drafters, including the Act’s namesake, US Senator John Sherman, were operating in a world where protectionist economics dominated. Karl Marx had just recently completed his critique of untethered capitalism, Das Kapital, and international trade was largely confined to the exchange of raw materials. These drafters were responding to an issue very topical to the late-nineteenth century— John D. Rockefeller’s monopoly over American oil. The situation came to a head in 1882 when Samuel Dodd, the attorney to ...


Can Covid-19 Get Congress To Finally Strengthen U.S. Antitrust Law?, Robert H. Lande, Sandeep Vaheesan 2020 University of Baltimore School of Law

Can Covid-19 Get Congress To Finally Strengthen U.S. Antitrust Law?, Robert H. Lande, Sandeep Vaheesan

All Faculty Scholarship

The COVID-19 pandemic could cause Congress to strengthen our merger laws. The authors of this short article strongly urge Congress to do this, but to do this in a manner that ignores 5 myths that underpin current merger policy:

Myth 1: Mergers Eliminate Wasteful Redundancies and Produce More Efficient Businesses
Myth 2: Current Merger Enforcement Protects Consumers
Myth 3: Merger Remedies Preserve Competition
Myth 4: The Current Merger Review System Offers Transparency and Guidance to Businesses and the Public
Myth 5: Corporations Need Mergers to Grow


How Much You Talk Matters: Cheap Talk And Collusion In A Bertrand Oligopoly Game, Jun Yeong Lee, Elizabeth Hoffman 2020 Iowa State University

How Much You Talk Matters: Cheap Talk And Collusion In A Bertrand Oligopoly Game, Jun Yeong Lee, Elizabeth Hoffman

Economics Working Papers

81818app手机版下载This study investigates the impact of cheap talk on price in a repeated Bertrand oligopoly experiment. Each participant plays 20 rounds. Participants are placed in three-person bidding groups where the lowest bid wins. During the first 10 rounds, participants are not allowed to communicate with each other. All three-person groups converged to the zero-profit equilibrium in the first 10 periods. We then play another 10 rounds where participants can text with one another using an instant message system. Some groups were allowed to text before every round, some to text before every other round, some to text every third round ...